The easy answer to the question posed by The Economist is that reform of the financial regulatory structure was not on the Congressional agenda.  Important change in the distribution of regulatory authority among existing agencies was on several private agendas however, but these had little to do with regulatory reform and probably made the problem worse. 

I have written often about the need to update and modernize the financial regulatory structure, as have a great many other people.  However, in the enthusiasm to modernize, it is likely that not enough attention has been paid to the problem of doing so, particularly in this country.  Accordingly, this report takes another look at the subject.  Specifically, the report addresses the question: Is significant reform of the financial regulatory structure feasible for the U.S.? 

Section I deals with the problems faced by the U. S. and many other nations of having to devise financial regulatory structures that will take into account the disappearing distinctions between financial institutions and industries, with special attention given the difference between the course taken by this country with that taken by most of the rest of the world.  Section II discusses some of the obstacles to structural reform, particularly agency consolidation, that are unique to the U.S..  Section III focuses on the proper role for the central bank in regulatory reform, and Section IV presents my conclusions, in which I come perilously close to calling for a study commission, albeit a prestigious one operating under a tight deadline.