Vol. 2001-2
The FDIC In The 1950s: A Retrospective Look
And Some Current Implications
On several occasions recently, the American Banker has mentioned that
Mr. Don Powell, a prominent Texas community banker, will likely be nominated by
the President to serve as the next Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the term of the present Chairman having expired (American Banker,
February 26, 2001). Occasionally such reports turn out to be premature or are
trial balloons, although there is little evidence in this instance that such is
likely to be the case. Still, other names pop up from time to time in the
financial press. In any event, the Administration seems to be in the process of
selecting a new Chairman. An intriguing question is how the new Chairman will
view the deposit insurance reform effort begun under the direction of the
current Chairman, Donna Tanoue. Several months ago I prepared an unusually lengthy report on deposit
insurance reform (Vol. 2000-8: "Reflections on Deposit Insurance Reform;
What It May Mean and Why"). I will not review or summarize that report here
and will make only occasional reference to it, but we would be happy to make
copies available to readers, at no cost. Frankly, my first thought on reading of
the Administration’s intention was that a new chairman would be joining the
FDIC almost precisely 50 years after I had joined the same Corporation as a
newly-minted financial economist. Of course this led me to think of the FDIC as
it was a half century ago, and how much it has since changed. This, in turn,
prompted the present report. In 1950 the FDIC had been in full operation for only about 16 years, and many
of its "founding" officials were still there. The new Corporation’s
culture, along with its attitude towards banks, bankers, and other regulatory
agencies, had been shaped by the Great Depression of the early 1930s, and even
more importantly by the fact that the new players had successfully organized and
managed an institution that many persons believed would quickly suffer the same
fate as the deposit insurance systems organized in eight states between 1908 and
1917, all of which had closed by 1930 or well before. The FDIC has had a much
different history and I have often thought that a better understanding of the
early days of the new deposit insurance system, as well as the reasons why it
later changed in significant ways, could be useful, particularly now that reform
is under discussion. Over the years friends occasionally have suggested that I
try my hand at this, I suppose because so few persons remain who can speak with
much if any recollection or knowledge of the early days of federal deposit
insurance. This seems to be an appropriate time. If it is not, I am sure to hear
about it from readers. The first section (I) consists largely of personal recollections. As I
describe a bit later, the FDIC was a very small organization when I joined it
(and also when I left it almost ten years later). I was one of only two or three
economists in the entire Division of Research and Statistics and one of my
assignments, in the beginning and until I left, was to assemble the FDIC’s
Annual Report and do much of the writing. This meant that for several months in
each year I was spending a great deal of time talking to people in all parts of
the agency. That assignment, along with an increasing amount of work done on
legislative matters, and even a brief early tour as a bank examiner, does not
necessarily make me the best observer of the FDIC for this period, but I at
least I had the opportunity to view it from a variety of vantage points, and to
talk at some length with many of the "founders." Section II describes the changes that took place in the FDIC after the 1950s
and particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. The underlying reasons are well
known and will simply be noted. They include, most obviously, several
significant pieces of legislation: the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the large number
of Acts that dealt with consumer interests, including the Community Reinvestment
Act, and the many deregulation Acts of the 1970s and 1980s. I will not describe
or explore these Acts, or related economic developments, but simply make some
observations on their effect on the FDIC and their possible relevance to deposit
insurance reform. Finally, Section III wraps up by suggesting a few conclusions
or lessons that might be drawn from this mini-history.